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THE ONCE AND FUTURE PROMISE OF ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN WASHINGTON’S ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
Justice Debra Stephens*
INTRODUCTION
As a judge, I am committed to the idea that access to justice is a
fundamental right. This right ensures a court system that is open, honest,
and accessible to all. Courts and scholars have struggled in their attempts
to uncover the historical roots of this right, to find its clear expression in
the provisions of our state and federal constitutions, and to give it effect
in concrete situations. This paper does not add to the existing scholarship
in terms of historical research or new theory. I am not a historian, nor an
academic. What I hope to set out in these pages is a sufficient “working
knowledge” of the provenance of the right of access to courts to justify
reliance on Washington’s article I, section 10 as an expression of this
right. More broadly, I consider whether courts might better effectuate
access to justice by focusing less on article I, section 10 as an individual
right and more on its systemic, institutional value.
Part I reviews the adoption of article I, section 10 in the 1889
Washington State Constitution, tracing its origins to Magna Carta in
1215 and to legal philosophies well known to the drafters of our federal
and state constitutions. Part II considers judicial interpretations of article
I, section 10 relevant to access to justice principles. Finally, Part III
ponders whether we might better effectuate the promise of article I,
section 10 by looking beyond the dominant individual rights focus of
most cases and appreciating that access to justice also expresses a
collective or systemic value in our democratic system. This Part returns
to a theme identified in the first Washington State Supreme Court case to
cite article I, section 10, which recognized it as a mandatory obligation
of government. Focusing greater attention on access to justice in its
collective expression emphasizes the special role courts play in
*Justice, Washington State Supreme Court. I owe a debt of gratitude for their insights and assistance
to Thomas Glassman, William Goodling, Diego Rondón Ichikawa, Judy Vandervort, Devra Cohen,
and Hugh Spitzer.
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preserving democracy, and the special claim they have on public
confidence and resources.
I.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 AND ITS
ORIGINS

When Constitutional Convention delegate, Allen Weir, delivered a
proposed bill of rights to the Washington State Constitutional
Convention on July 11, 1889, article I, section 8 read:
No court shall be secret but justice shall be administered openly
and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every
person shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done
him in his person, property or reputation.1
This open courts clause was a verbatim copy of the Oregon
Constitution at the time.2 Fourteen days later, the Committee on
Preamble and Bill of Rights presented new language3 to the Committee
as a whole, which adopted it.4 Article I, section 8 was moved to article I,
section 10:
Administration of Justice: Justice in all cases shall be
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.5
There is no indication as to why the language was changed.6 Some
have surmised that the truncated language denotes a truncated right.7

1. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 51 (Beverly
Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL].
2. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 19. A group which included Messrs. Warner, Hicks, Comegys,
Henry, Dallam, Kellog, and Sohns but did not include Mr. Weir, who had originally delivered the
language fourteen days earlier.
4. Id. at 154. It was not only the open courts clause that changed, but the entire Bill of Rights.
Further, it was stretched from twenty-five sections to thirty-one.
5. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. This is the language as it stands today. See JOURNAL, supra note 1,
at 499.
6. Janice Sue Wang, State Constitutional Remedy Provisions and Article I, Section 10 of the
Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater Judicial Protection of Established Tort
Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 WASH. L. REV. 203, 215 (1989) (quoting JOURNAL, supra note
1, at 51). The verbatim notes of the Constitutional Convention have been lost or destroyed. Further,
a search of the Washington State Archives revealed only two saved documents, both handwritten,
from the committee on Preamble and the Bill of Rights, neither of which offer any explanation for
the textual changes. No other documents relating to the preamble or bill of rights exist at the
Washington State Archives. The minutes, contained on microfiche at the Washington State Law
Library and printed in Rosenow’s book, do not reveal any of the committee discussion on the
Washington State Bill of Rights but rather only the votes and the initial and final versions of article
I, section 10.
7. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, The Constitutional Validity of the Modification of Joint and Several
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Indeed, in Shea v. Olson8 in 1936 the Washington State Supreme Court
stated that Washington’s constitution, unlike the constitutions in Oregon
and some other states, contains no right-to-access remedy provision.9
Notably, the court in Shea made no mention of article I, section 10.
Given the absence of any stated intent, however, it seems unwise to read
too much into the particular language. A purely textual approach fails to
account for the historically-grounded meaning of clauses such as article
I, section 10, which was quite familiar to the framers of the Washington
State Constitution.
Article I, section 10 expresses principles traceable to chapters 39 and
40 of the original Magna Carta of 1215. This document, recognized as
embodying the “rule of law,” emerged out of the conflict between King
John and rebellious barons who insisted on putting to paper a declaration
of fundamental rights “that had heretofore been vaguely understood,” to
“make it more difficult for the king to ignore or evade them.”10 The
original language read:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled
or in any other way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send
upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse
or delay, right or justice (translated from Latin to English).11
The Magna Carta was reissued several times, and eventually chapters 39
and 40 reemerged as chapter 29 of the charter published in 1297:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
Liability in the Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 433, 449 n.75
(1990) (“It is a quantum leap from that ‘open access’ provision to guarantee a right to a particular
tort remedy or substantive rule of law.”). But see Wang, supra, note 6, at 225–26 (article I, section
10 of the Washington State Constitution “can also become a guarantee of the right to a remedy,
protecting tort victims from future inroads by the legislature into their right to recover”).
8. 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
9. Id. at 160–61, 53 P.2d at 622 (“In this state, the Constitution contains no such [remedy]
provision, but only the general ‘due process’ and ‘equal protection’ clauses. There is, therefore, no
express, positive mandate of the Constitution which preserves such [tort] rights of action from
abolition by the Legislature.”). But see King v. King, 162 Wash. 2d 378, 388, 174 P.3d 659, 664
(2007) (“We have generally applied the open courts clause in one of two contexts: ‘the right of the
public and press to be present and gather information at trial and the right to a remedy for a wrong
suffered.’” (citing ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 24 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2002)).
10. William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical
Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333,
349–50 (1997).
11. Id. at 350 (quoting generally accepted translation, based on WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA, A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 49 (2d ed. 1914)).
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or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgement of his peers, or by the
law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either justice or right.12
In his Second Institute, Lord Edward Coke found that chapter 29 of
the 1297 Magna Carta was the root from which “many fruitfull [sic]
branches of the law of England have sprung.”13 One such branch grew
into modern due process, while another is seen as the seedling for a right
of all citizens to a remedy in their private relations with one another.14
The link between the words of the Magna Carta and article I, section 10
was established by Coke, who described chapter 29 as confirming that:
[E]very subject of this realm, for injury done to him in goods,
lands, or person, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical, or
temporall, . . . or any other without exception, may take his
remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for
the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any
deniall, and speedily without delay . . . . [J]ustice must have
three qualities; it must be . . . free; for nothing is more odious
than justice let to sale; full, for justice ought not to limp, or be
granted piece-meal; and speedily, for delay is a kind of denial;
and then it is both justice and right.15
It is well recognized that Lord Coke’s teachings were highly influential
in the American colonies, and his view of chapter 29’s meaning
prevailed among the drafters of colonial and state charters.16
More broadly, the philosophy of natural rights or natural law also
resonated with constitutional framers, including the delegates to the
Washington State Constitutional Convention.17 Certainly by 1889, Sir
12. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45
(London, W. Clarke and Sons 1817) (1641).
13. Id.
14. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1320
(2003).
15. Id. at 1320–21 (translating portions of Latin in COKE, supra note 12, at 55).
16. See Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 175–76 (1928); David Schuman, Oregon’s Remedy Guarantee: Article I,
Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 39 (1986) (“While commentators
generally agree that Coke’s interpretation of the Magna Carta is more enthusiastic than accurate, no
one doubts its influence, particularly in America.” (citation omitted)).
17. See James A. Bamberger, Confirming the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access to the
Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington State, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 383, 392–93, 427 n.28
(2005) (explaining natural law theory expressed in Washington State Constitution); id. at 424 n.43
(referencing influence of non-delegate W. Lair Hill, whose contemporaneous writings in the
Oregonian newspaper confirm the natural rights philosophy embraced by the framers); W. Lair Hill,
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William Blackstone’s commentaries were widely read and accepted.18
Blackstone described the right to a remedy drawn from the Magna Carta
as a critical portion of his triune rule for absolute rights: “The right of
personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private
property.”19 He distinguished these rights from “relative” rights which
arose only through a free society where people have relationships with
others.20 “But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and
protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided
no other method to secure their actual enjoyment.”21 Absolute rights
“could not be protected simply by declaratory law; individuals required
means of vindicating them” including the “right to a remedy.”22
Recognizing the theory of law embraced by Washington’s
constitutional framers, and the direct lineage connecting article I, section
10 to chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta, it is difficult to justify a
crabbed reading of this provision. We should not focus so narrowly on
the precise phrasing that we miss the significance of the framers’
insistence upon including this well-understood statement in the first
place. In fact, the framers altered and deleted much of the language
proposed in the initial July 11 draft of the bill of rights. For example,
changes were made to article I, section 1 which originally read:
All men are possessed of equal and unalienable natural rights,
among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All
power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety
and happiness; and they have at all times the right to alter or
reform the government as they may think proper.23
No one would suggest that because the delegates saw fit to remove the

Washington: A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 4, 1889, at
v–vi.
18. See Koch, supra note 10, at 357–65.
19. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. Blackstone’s commentaries were published
between 1765 and 1769.
20. Id. at *422.
21. Id. at *140–41.
22. Phillips, supra note 14, at 1321–22; see BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *141–44. In his third
volume of commentaries, Blackstone observed: “for it is a settled and invariable principle in the
laws of England, that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *109; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163
(1803) (citing 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19) (“The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
23. JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 51.
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clause that all men are possessed of “equal and unalienable natural
rights” this signified their rejection of the natural rights theory.24
Applying this logic to the removal of other provisions such as the “right
to alter or reform the government” or that Washington was “an
inseparable part of the American Union” is nonsensical.25 No one would
suggest this intimated a separatist movement was afoot.
Additional confirmation that the drafters did not intend to diminish
rights by trimming the wording of particular bill of rights provisions can
be found in article I, section 30, which expressly recognizes that “[t]he
enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny others retained by the people.”26 The State Supreme Court
understood this early in Washington’s history:
[T]he expression that the declaration of certain fundamental
rights belonging to all individuals and made in the bill of rights
shall not be construed to mean the abandonment of others not
expressed, which inherently exist in all civilized and free states.
Those expressly declared were evidently such as the history and
experience of our people had shown were most frequently
invaded by arbitrary power, and they were defined and asserted
affirmatively. Consistently with the affirmative declaration of
such rights, it has been universally recognized by the
profoundest jurists and statesmen that certain fundamental,
inalienable rights under the laws of God and nature are
immutable, and cannot be violated by any authority founded in
right.27
Further evidence of the framers’ commitment to natural rights and
natural law theory is their decision to include article I, section 32:
“Fundamental principles: A frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is essential to the security of individual right and the
perpetuity of free government.”28
This cursory overview barely scratches the surface of what is known
about the meaning and origins of Washington’s article I, section 10 and
comparable provisions in other state constitutions.29 Many excellent
24. See id. at 51, 154.
25. The “right to alter or reform the government” and “The State of Washington is an inseparable
part of the American Union” were removed. Id.
26. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 30; see also id. art. I, § 1 (noting “governments . . . are established to
protect and maintain individual rights”).
27. State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 443–44, 71 P. 20, 21 (1902).
28. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32; see also ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 57 (2d ed. 2013).
29. Most notably, I do not address the significant movements in history beyond the Magna Carta
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works provide a far more thorough review.30 For one thing, they confirm
that, by most counts, forty states have parallel provisions traceable to
chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta.31 The interpretation of these
provisions by state courts varies greatly, not generally based on
textualist approaches, and sometimes even among decisions within a
single state.32 Moreover, the concepts embodied in article I, section 10
are not easily compartmentalized, as they encompass notions of due
process, privileges and immunities, equal protection, the right to trial by
jury, and more generally the very role of a justice system.33
Despite the fact that many unanswered questions remain, I resist the
suggestion that courts should hold back in attempting to broadly
effectuate an access-to-courts principle because we know too little.34 The
origin of article I, section 10 reveals quite a lot, not the least of which is
and its interpretation by Lord Coke and Blackstone that shape our modern legal understanding.
Themes drawn from American political history and thought, and more broadly the experience of
effectuating natural rights in a democratic society, all help shape our present understanding of the
interconnected principles expressed in part in article I, section 10 and related provisions. See
generally Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of
Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917 (2012).
30. See John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the
State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237 (1991); JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (4th ed. 2006 & Supp.); H.D.
Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on America Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1917); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to
Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001); Resnik, supra
note 29, at 917; Schuman, supra note 16, at 35; David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 1197 (1992); Wang, supra note 6, at 205–18.
31. Phillips, supra note 14, at 1310; see FREISEN, supra note 30, at 6-65 to 6-67 (separating
different versions of article I, section 10 type clauses). For a recently prepared appendix of state
provisions, see Resnik, supra note 29, at 1021–54 (appendix).
32. See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1326–39 (reviewing various approaches); id. at 1314 (“There is
no correlation between the words of a particular guarantee and how expansively the courts of that
state have applied it.”); Bauman, supra note 30, at 244 (noting varying interpretations of identical
texts); see, e.g., Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 518 (Or. 1989) (Linde, J., concurring)
(observing the Oregon Supreme Court “has written many individually tenable but inconsistent
opinions” about the right to a remedy); Koch, supra note 10, at 436 (suggesting one explanation for
the plurality of state court interpretations is “the absence of the unifying effect of the United States
Supreme Court decisions supplying the states with a convenient decision-making paradigm”).
33. For this reason, I disagree somewhat with Koch’s observation about the absence of a federal
article I, section 10 parallel. Numerous United States Supreme Court decisions have informed state
court interpretations concerning access to justice, regardless of the rights rubric a court invokes. See,
e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
34. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1005 (positing history to date can confirm only original intent
of chapter 29 Magna Carta clause was to protect against the king’s interference with local courts). I
agree, however, with the author’s conclusion that courts should clearly articulate the grounds,
historical or otherwise, for the analysis of open courts clauses.
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the interconnectedness of the constitutional principles emanating from
chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta. For a sense of how these principles
shape the promise of access to justice in Washington, it is helpful to
briefly consider the areas in which article I, section 10 has been
addressed in Washington State Supreme Court decisions.
II.

SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 RELEVANT TO ACCESS TO
JUSTICE PRINCIPLES

Washington appellate decisions have cited article I, section 10
hundreds of times, most often with respect to the right to open, public
court proceedings and records.35 It is now well established that article I,
section 10 secures this right for the general public as well as individual
litigants.36 And, there is a recognized link between this aspect of article
I, section 10 and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as well as the public criminal trial guarantees in article I, section 22 and
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.37 This aspect of
article I, section 10 is also reflected in the Judiciary article of the
Washington Constitution, providing that courts will remain open except
on nonjudicial days.38
A separate line of decisions considers whether article I, section 10
guarantees an individual a right to meaningfully participate in litigation,
including to seek particular substantive remedies. In this vein, decisions
have largely involved challenges to legislative changes to remedial
mechanisms or court processes, with Washington cases arising in areas
familiar to other state courts.39 Importantly, these decisions are not
limited to consideration of open courts clauses, but also involve, among
others, constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection,
privileges and immunities, jury trial, vested rights and the principle of

35. See, e.g., Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900, 93 P.3d 861 (2004) (records); Seattle Times Co.
v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982) (proceedings).
36. Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 209–10, 848 P.2d 1258,
1260–61 (1993) (public’s right); In re Det. of Morgan, 180 Wash. 2d 312, 325, 330 P.3d 774, 781
(2014) (individual right in civil proceeding).
37. See generally Anne L. Ellington & Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, In Washington State, Open
Courts Jurisprudence Consists Mainly of Open Questions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (2013);
Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s Public Trial and
Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203 (2012).
38. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Supreme Court of Washington); id. § 6 (superior courts).
39. See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1335–39 (categorizing waves of decisions).
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separation of powers.40 Commentators often group them according to the
type of legislation challenged or the test devised by the court to measure
constitutional compliance.41 Thus, it is possible to compare decisions
considering the abolition of common law actions in favor of workers
compensation laws,42 the abolition of heart balm actions,43 the validity of
guest/host statutes,44 enactment of statutes of repose in the construction
field,45 and waves of legislative reform affecting product liability and
medical malpractice actions.46
As commentators recognize, access to courts per se has not always
been the guiding principle in these cases.47 Notions of due process, equal
protection and “vested rights” may shape the particular lens for judicial
review, which has been largely deferential to the legislative prerogative
to make policy. Thus, Washington decisions have sustained the
legislative abolition of rights of action if an adequate substitute remedy
is given, or if the legislation is justified by substantial public necessity.48
These decisions, implicating access to justice, whether under article I,
section 10 or other constitutional provisions, bring into stark relief the
inherent tension between recognition of an individual right to litigate and
the legislative prerogative to make policy.49
40. See id.; Charles K. Wiggins et al., Washington’s 1986 Tort Legislation and the State
Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 193, 196–204 (1986–87) (surveying
constitutional doctrines involved in challenges to tort reform legislation).
41. See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1335–39 (noting groups of cases across states); Wiggins et al.,
supra note 40, at 226–54 (analyzing tort reform provisions under various constitutional tests).
42. See State ex rel. Fletcher v. Carroll, 94 Wash. 531, 162 P. 593 (1917); Wiggins et al., supra
note 40, at 211–12.
43. See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1331; Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948)
(upholding repeal of action for alienation of affections).
44. See Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
45. See 1519-1525 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 144 Wash. 2d 570,
29 P.3d 1249 (2001).
46. See Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wash. 2d 769, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012); Putman v. Wenatchee
Valley Med. Ctr., P.S., 166 Wash. 2d 974, 216 P.3d 374 (2009); Phillips, supra note 14, at 1332–24.
47. See Wiggins et al., supra note 40, at 196–204 (overview). Ironically, Washington boldly
proclaimed a “right of access to the courts” based on article I, section 4 in Carter v. University of
Washington, 85 Wash. 2d 391, 398, 536 P.2d 618, 623 (1975), only to reverse itself the next year in
Housing Authority v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 742, 557 P.2d 321, 327 (1976), which recognizes
“[a]ccess to the courts is amply and expressly protected by other provisions,” but does not say
which provisions. See Wiggins et al., supra note 40, at 201–02.
48. See Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975); Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 423, 63 P.2d 397, 408–09 (1936); State ex rel. Fletcher v. Carroll, 94
Wash. 531, 162 P. 593 (1917); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (leading case holding that
legislation must either provide a substitute remedy or be justified by overpowering public
necessity).
49. The decision in 1519-1525 Lakeview Boulevard Condominium Ass’n is illustrative. There, the
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This tension necessarily implicates separation of powers concerns, as
the individual right translates into the duty and prerogative of the
judicial branch to declare what the law is.50 The looming shadow of
separation of powers seems to shrink when the challenge at issue
concerns a statute directly affecting court procedures. In such instances,
the Washington State Supreme Court has not hesitated to recognize a
right of access to courts under article I, section 10 that prohibits the
legislature from denying certain litigants their ability to litigate. For
example, in Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center51 the Court recognized
that the broad right of a litigant to discovery under the court rules cannot
be legislatively abrogated because it “is necessary to ensure access to the
party seeking the discovery.”52 The Court eloquently observed:
[J]ustice which is to be administered openly is not an abstract
theory of constitutional law, but rather is the bedrock foundation
upon which rests all of the people’s rights and obligations. In the
course of administering justice the courts protect those rights
and enforce those obligations. Indeed, the very first enactment
of our state constitution is the declaration that governments are
established to protect and maintain individual rights.53
The Court returned to this theme in Putman v. Wenatchee Valley
Medical Center, P.S.,54 invalidating a medical malpractice “certificate of
merit” statute as violating both access to courts under article I, section
10 and separation of powers.55 Two authorities sufficed to justify the
Court’s conclusion that the statute infringed on the plaintiff’s right of

Court refused to entertain an access to courts challenge to a builders’ statute of repose, RCW
4.16.310. Lakeview, 144 Wash. 2d at 581, 29 P.3d at 1255. Noting that Shea was not dispositive
because it did not address article I, section 10, the Court adopted what it described as the view of the
Oregon Supreme Court, recognizing the “‘proper function of legislatures to limit the availability of
causes of action by the use of statutes of limitation so long as it is done for the purpose of protecting
a recognized public interest.’” Id. (quoting Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (Or. 1971),
abrogated on other grounds, Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001)). The
Court concluded: “Because we recognize that the legislature has broad police power to pass laws
tending to promote the public welfare, we decline at this time to determine whether article I, section
10 of the state constitution guarantees a right to a remedy.” Id.
50. This underscores the recognized connection between the right to a remedy principle expressed
in open courts clauses and expressed more globally as inherent in the role of courts, as in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
51. 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
52. Id. at 782, 819 P.2d at 376.
53. Id. at 780, 819 P.2d at 375.
54. 166 Wash. 2d 974, 216 P.3d 374 (2009).
55. Id. at 979–85, 216 P.3d at 376–80.
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access: Puget Sound Blood Center and Marbury v. Madison.56
Subsequently, in Lowy v. Peacehealth,57 the Court again relied on Puget
Sound Blood Center to conclude that a litigant’s ability to conduct
discovery is protected by the right of access under article I, section 10.
This constitutional principle supported a narrow construction of a
hospital quality improvement statute to refer only to external review and
not internal review of medical errors.58
The limited reach of these decisions is clear from the cautionary
passage in Puget Sound Blood Center.59 The Court did not announce a
broad right to a substantive remedy, nor suggest any retreat from its
earlier decisions recognizing the power of the legislature to restrict,
modify or eliminate causes of action entirely based on providing a
substitute remedy or demonstrating a strong public necessity to do so.
This is not to say that the Court has failed to appreciate the interest of
litigants in seeking a remedy for injury or in asserting common law
defenses.60 However, it has not to date relied on this interest as sufficient
to impose an absolute limit on the legislature’s prerogative to modify the
common law.61
This brings us to the question of money, or more precisely, the
Court’s response to claims that the expense of litigation denies access to
justice. In this vein, the Court has observed: “Our cases on the right of
access are somewhat perplexing.”62 A brief flurry of activity arose

56. Id. at 979, 216 P.3d at 377 (“Requiring plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting their claims
prior to the discovery process violates the plaintiffs’ right of access to courts. It is the duty of the
courts to administer justice by protecting the legal rights and enforcing the legal obligations of the
people.”); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
57. 174 Wash. 2d 769, 776, 280 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2012).
58. Id. at 776–90, 280 P.3d at 1082–89.
59. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 781, 819 P.2d 370, 375 (1991) (“It is
important to note that our consideration here is of the right of access. We are not here considering
the validity of a theory of recovery. We are not considering legislative or judicial creation or
abolition of a cause of action. We are not considering the abrogation or diminishment of a common
law right. These are all issues for other cases.” (citing Wiggins et al., supra note 40)).
60. For example, in Hunter v. North Mason High School, the Court held: “The right to be
indemnified for personal injuries is a substantial property right.” 85 Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d
845, 848 (1975); see also Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d at 782, 819 P.2d at 375 (citing
Hunter).
61. See 1519-1525 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 144 Wash. 2d 570,
29 P.3d 1249 (2001) (refusing to invalidate state of repose as violating article I, section 10); c.f.,
Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975) (applying due process vested rights
analysis and refusing to invalidate statute modifying common law to remove plaintiff’s contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery).
62. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d at 781, 819 P.2d at 375.

Stephens_final.docx (Do Not Delete)

52

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

2/18/2016 6:03 PM

[Vol. 91:41

following O’Connor v. Matzdorff,63 where the Court waived a filing fee
to secure access for indigent litigants.64 Then in Iverson v. Marine
Bancorporation,65 the Court acknowledged the prohibitive costs incident
to an appeal, and said: “The administration of justice demands that the
doors of the judicial system be open to the indigent as well as to those
who can afford to pay the costs of pursuing judicial relief.”66 Neither of
these cases expressly relied on article I, section 10. And, as noted, a
subsequent plurality decision pinning the “right of access to the courts”
on article I, section 4 was disowned within a year.67 In Housing
Authority v. Saylors68 the court expressed no doubt that a right of access
to courts is protected by the Washington State Constitution, but it did not
identify article I, section 10 as the source.69
The big push for recognizing that the right of access to courts requires
committing resources to assist poor civil litigants came in King v. King.70
There, the Court considered whether a litigant in a dissolution
proceeding involving custody of children was entitled to counsel at
public expense under various constitutional provisions, including article
I, section 10.71 While the Court acknowledged its statement in Bullock v.
Roberts72 that, “[f]ull access to the courts in a divorce action is a
fundamental right,”73 it refused to extend this right beyond the
requirement of courts to remove physical barriers to court access or to
waive court fees.74 King highlights the difficulty courts face when
considering the right of access to justice as a mandate for public
spending on private civil litigation. Even when their own essential

63. 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
64. Id.
65. 83 Wash. 2d 163, 517 P.2d 197 (1973).
66. Id. at 167–78 (“Consistent with our affirmative duty to keep the doors of justice open to all
with what appears to be a meritorious claim for judicial relief, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to
the relief requested [waiver of appellate fees and costs].”).
67. See Carter v. Univ. of Wash., 85 Wash. 2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (1975), abrogated in part,
Hous. Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
68. 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
69. Id. at 742, 557 P.2d at 327; see also Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 782,
819 P.2d 370, 375 (1991) (saying of Saylors, “[u]nfortunately, the court did not explore the
rationale for its conclusion”).
70. 162 Wash. 2d 378, 388, 174 P.3d 659, 664 (2007).
71. Id. at 381, 174 P.3d at 661.
72. 84 Wash. 2d 101, 104, 524 P.2d 385, 387 (1974).
73. Id. at 104 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
74. King, 162 Wash. 2d at 390, 174 P.3d at 665–66 (“It is more than an insignificant linguistic
leap to equate that barrier to access with a right to publicly funded legal representation.”).
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funding is at issue, courts express reluctance to announce a broad right
of access and are careful to respect the prerogative of legislative bodies
to allocate public resources.75
This brief overview of Washington case law offers an opportunity to
pause and consider the path forward. Apart from a handful of statements
in cases addressing the public trial aspect of article I, section 10,
descriptions of the access-to-courts principle to date generally frame it as
an individual right. More precisely, cases recognize it as a legitimate
interest of individual litigants. However, I believe there is value in
broadening this focus, and reconsidering article I, section 10 in its
collective, communal sense. In this sense, it expresses not simply an
individual right or interest in court processes or remedies, but also a
societal commitment to an open and meaningful system of justice.
III.

SEEING THE GREATER GOOD IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 10

The first Washington State Supreme Court decision to cite article I,
section 10 was Rauch v. Chapman76 in 1897.77 I have previously relied
on Rauch for the proposition that article I, section 10 is mandatory.78
But, until musing on the themes in this Essay, I had not fully appreciated
its teachings.
Rauch involved an action by a taxpayer in Klickitat County to enjoin
the county treasurer from paying certain warrants, including for juror
fees, witness fees in criminal matters, and sheriff’s fees for serving
process.79 The taxpayer complained that paying these bills required the
county to exceed its debt limit under article VIII, section 6 of the
Washington State Constitution. The Court rejected this argument,
holding the debt limit was not intended to restrict the county’s ability to
provide for “certain necessary fundamental functions of government.” 80
Quoting article I, section 10 and other bill of rights provisions implicated
75. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). This decision, notable in
recognizing the inherent power of the judiciary to compel the legislature to expend funds for court
operations, makes no mention of article I, section 10. Based solely on a separation of powers
analysis, the Court adopted a deferential standard requiring clear, cogent and convincing proof that
court action is needed.
76. 16 Wash. 568, 48 P. 253 (1897).
77. Id. at 575, 48 P. at 255.
78. See State v. Beskurt, 176 Wash. 2d 441, 457, 293 P.3d 1159, 1167 (2013) (Stephens, J.,
concurring); State v. Duckett, 141 Wash. App. 797, 804, 173 P.3d 948, 951 (2007).
79. Rauch, 16 Wash. at 568–69, 48 P. at 253.
80. Id. at 574, 48 P. at 255.
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by the county warrants, the Court explained:
All these provisions of their organic law are alike declared to be
mandatory. It would make these various provisions of the
constitution contradictory, and render some of them nugatory, if
a construction were placed upon the limitation of county
indebtedness which would destroy the efficiency of the agencies
established by the constitution to carry out the recognized and
essential powers of government. It cannot be conceived that the
people who framed and adopted the constitution had such
consequences in view.81
The Court’s holding conveys more than the simple reality that
government costs money, though that is certainly the bottom line.82
Rauch recognizes the higher law embodied in the constitution, which is
“‘[d]esigned for [the people’s] protection in the enjoyment of the rights
and powers which they possessed before the constitution was made.’”83
It articulates the vision of ordered society the framers embraced—with
meaningful access to the courts at its center. For me, the discussion in
Rauch underscores the word in article I, section 10 that has been the
least emphasized in our cases: “Justice in all cases shall be administered
openly, and without unnecessary delay.”84
Inherent in this concept of justice is both an individual and a
collective, systemic right. Both are important, and focusing on individual
rights helps underscore the plurality of ways constitutional rights are
experienced in daily life. A unique value in litigating individual rights
lies in the repetition of similar stories involving different players. Judith
Resnik has argued that “[t]he redundancy produced by litigants raising
parallel claims of rights enables debate about the underlying legal rules.
The particular structural obligations of trial level courts have advantages
for producing, redistributing, and curbing power in a fashion that is
generative in democracies.”85
But, returning to the themes in Rauch, it is also important to recognize
the collective right of access to justice secured by article I, section 10.
81. Id. at 575, 48 P. at 255.
82. See Duryee v. Friars, 18 Wash. 55, 60, 50 P. 583, 585 (1897) (saying of Rauch: “And with
that holding we are well content; for that the maintenance of its government is of paramount
importance needs no argument, and it cannot be done without money, or resorting to the county’s
credit in some way”).
83. Rauch, 16 Wash. at 572, 48 P. at 253 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION (1868)).
84. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
85. Resnik, supra note 29, at 938.
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The promise that justice shall be administered openly and without undue
delay describes a particular system of justice, i.e. a court system. As the
Court recognized in Rauch, the framers plainly understood the open
administration of justice to be an obligation of government, as essential
to its functions as any part of government. In this sense, article I, section
10 differs from other, liberty-oriented bill of rights provisions. This
aspect of article I, section 10 does not speak to freedoms citizens may
exercise but to an institution the government must maintain.86
Article I, section 10 is different from individually-focused bill of
rights provisions in another way. A court’s obligations under this
provision do not depend on individual litigants asserting their rights. In
the public trial context, Washington case law has long recognized that
article I, section 10 imposes an independent duty on courts to engage in
a careful analysis before closing any proceeding, regardless of whether
the parties before the court object to closure.87 This precedent is built in
part on the understanding that article I, section 10 is more than an
individual trial right; it speaks to rights held by the public as a whole.88
A natural corollary is that article I, section 10 requires the maintenance
of a justice system consistent with its values.
The core value at the heart of article I, section 10 is open, impartial
justice. It has long been recognized that access to courts is “conservative
of all other rights.”89 It is essential to the maintenance of civil society.90
86. There is, of course, a collective notion inherent in the recognition of individual rights
generally, though it is often overlooked. Many provisions in early colonial charters and state
constitutions use express language to make this point. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776 art. VIII (“That
every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,
and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, and yield
his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto . . . .”); THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 22 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)
(guaranteeing that all inhabitants “may from Time to Time, and at all Times, freely and fully have
and enjoy his and their Judgments and Consciences in matters of Religion throughout the said
Province, they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly, and not using this Liberty to
Licentiousness, nor to the civil Injury or outward disturbance of others” (quoting CONCESSION AND
AGREEMENT OF THE LORDS PROPRIETORS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW CAESAREA, OR NEW-JERSEY
(1664)). There is a good example in the Washington State Constitution. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5
(“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.”). But, with or without such language, few would argue that the recognition of
individual rights is intended to elevate individual autonomy to the demise of the greater social good.
87. See State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 15–16, 288 P.3d 1113, 1120 (2012); State v. Bone-Club,
128 Wash. 2d 254, 257, 906 P.2d 325, 327 (1995) (citing State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 146–47,
217 P. 705, 706 (1923)).
88. State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 174, 137 P.2d 825, 828 (2006).
89. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
90. See The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 667 (1862) (noting “the true test” of the existence of
civil war is “[w]hen the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection,
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This recognition should inform the way courts interpret article I, section
10, so that its application in particular contexts remains true to its focus.
The failure of article I, section 10 to gain judicial acceptance as an
individual right to substantive remedies should not be regarded as fatal
to its effectiveness. Article I, section 10 remains an important expression
of a central tenet of our social order.
We must recognize that access to justice defies absolutism in practice.
No government has yet found the resources to fully fund all the promises
of justice made in state and federal constitutions.91 And we must not be
tempted to embrace an interpretation of a fundamental principle such as
access to courts without some sense of proportionality and purpose, lest
this constitutional right be made to carry the seeds of its own
destruction.
We have far to go to secure the promise of article I, section 10, but
focusing first and foremost on its collective promise of a meaningful
system of justice can help emphasize the central place the courts occupy
in our democratic society.92
CONCLUSION
Article I, section 10 expresses the fundamental right of access to
justice in Washington. While it may not be possible to explicate its
precise origins, or to fully define its parameters, we have a sufficient
working knowledge of its themes and provenance to justify reliance on
this provision to improve our justice system. To this end, I encourage
courts and commentators to reconsider the collective and systemic value
the right expresses. Without discounting its significance as an individual
right, we would do well to embrace article I, section 10’s collective
value as a constitutional mandate to develop and maintain a more open
and accessible justice system.

so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open”).
91. See Resnik, supra note 29, at 973–78 (surveying efforts to fund courts and improve access for
litigants).
92. See id. at 994 (“[C]ourts have a distinctive claim for public support as well as for public
regulation because governments need the infrastructure that courts provide, and democracies need
the opportunities for the multi-party interactions that adjudication entails. Courts offer links between
individuals and government, and hence have a special claim on resources. Diminution of
opportunities to use open courts impoverishes the status of individuals and diminishes the
effectiveness of government.”).

